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Available online 30 May 2018AbstractRecent financial crises have highlighted the importance of banking regulations to hedge against the high risk accredited to imbalances in
banks' balance sheets. Nonetheless, banking regulations may have adverse effects. On the one hand, they serve as prudential measures that
alleviate the effects of crises on the stability of the banking system while on the other hand; they may increase the cost of intermediation and
reduce banks' profitability. Implementation of non-suitable regulations such as Islamic banks adopting conventional banks regulations could also
impair banks' performance. This paper analyses the linkages between bank regulatory and supervisory structures associated with Basel III's
pillars has any significant impact on Islamic banks' performance in Asia and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) using two-step Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) technique. Findings suggest that regulatory variables are positively significant with Islamic banks' performance in
Asian region but not in the GCC.
Copyright © 2018, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
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JEL classification: G21; L51. Introduction
The recent global financial crisis (GFC) that originated from
United States between the years of 2007e2008 was mainly
caused by the inefficiency in regulating banking frameworks.
Deteriorating lending standards led to an accelerated credit
extension and leverage strategies by financial institutions. At
the inception of the GFC, many financial institutions were
highly leveraged, short on liquidity and possessed high expo-
sures in off balance sheet items. (Claessens & Kodres, 2014).
The relaxation in regulations encouraged financial institutions
to create highly complex instruments such as Collateralized
Debt Instruments (CDOs) and Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)
that are off balance sheet items which regulatory authorities* Corresponding author.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).failed to administer effectively (Krugman, 2009). From a
theoretical point of view, these defects would not have
occurred in an Islamic banking system because one of the
major culprits of these shortcomings interest rate (riba) is
prohibited under Sharia. The main theoretical background of
Islamic finance is to ensure risk-sharing between two parties in
a contract, therefore ensuring that risks undertaken are towards
economically value-adding projects (Ejaz & Khan, 2014), and
not towards creating artificial money in the market by charging
interest (riba) to borrowers.
The dilemma is, if Islamic banking is already self-insulated
from the flaws arising from conventional banking through
implementation of Sharia law, why do Islamic banks still need
regulatory frameworks? As stated above, the essence of Is-
lamic banking is that it is interest-free and risks in financial
contracts between an Islamic bank and its customer is equi-
tably distributed. These financial contracts are usually con-
ducted using profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts such asting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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Islamic banks do not utilize these PLS contracts extensively,
instead they make use of cost-plus contracts such as Mur-
abahah.1 There are many possible reasons behind this choice
of action. As discussed by Dar and Presley (2000), the general
reason behind the lack of usage of PLS contracts is due to its
susceptibility to agency problems. Entrepreneurs are more
likely to put less effort in a project and report lesser profits
than the actual figure in comparison to a self-funded entre-
preneur. Islamic banks are also reluctant to use PLS contracts
because it is mostly based on tangible assets like real estate
and many of the Muslim countries that are operating Islamic
banking systems do not have well founded rights on property
management, which imposes additional risk to the contract
(Dar & Presley, 2000).
The conventional approaches in mitigating risks are not
suitable for usage by Islamic banks mainly due to Islamic
banks' distinct way of operating. One of the unique risks faced
by Islamic banks is displaced commercial risk, whereby Is-
lamic banks may forego profits earned in order to provide a
competitive and comparable rate of return to their customers
to refrain from problems such as customers withdrawing their
capital and depositing it into conventional banks. Islamic
banks also face a major risk due to heavy asset-based
financing. Asset based financing relies heavily on in-
vestments in commodities and real estates which gives rise to
liquidity problems (Kammer et al., 2015, p. 38). Due to
complex structures of Islamic financing contracts arising from
strong reliance in real estate and commodities investment,
Islamic banks are also exposed to severe market and opera-
tional risks that are difficult to mitigate especially because
hedging instruments are not considered Sharia-compliant.
Similarly, conventional banks may suffer from liquidity risk,
market risk, credit risk and exchange rate risk as well, but
Islamic banks’ might encounter these risks more severely
because secondary market trading for Islamic contracts are not
very active. In other words, Islamic banking operations are
riskier in nature when compared to conventional banking,
which is why regulatory frameworks are of great importance.
It can be said that profitability of an Islamic bank reflects its
level of performance. However, the present-day issue is that
Islamic banks’ profitability continues to lag their big con-
ventional counterpart. As reported in the World Islamic
Banking Competitiveness Report 2013e2014 by Ernst &
Young, leading Islamic banks are reporting a Return on Equity
(ROE) that is 19% lower in comparison to conventional banks.
This is due to the fact that the Islamic financial industry is too1 The Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts are both based on partnership.
Under the Mudarabah contract, the Rab Al Mal is the fund provider while the
Mudarib is the person utilizing the funds for labour. In the event of a loss, only
the Rab Al Mal endures the loss because the Mudarib had already contributed
his labour efforts. The difference with a Musharakah contract is that both
partners in a Musharakah contract, contributes capital and labour and profit
and loss are shared between both parties. A Murabahah contract is a cost-plus
contract whereby the rate of profit for the fund provider is pre-determined and
agreed upon by both parties.focused on expanding the growth of Islamic banking. Another
cause of lagging profitability in Islamic banks is that most of
Islamic banks are either small in size or are operating within a
highly concentrated market (Ernst & Young, 2014, p. 82).
It can be seen from above that the nature of Islamic banking
operation demands an equally strong regulatory framework to
control for its underperformance and bring it on level playing
field of conventional banks. Therefore, in order to assess how
established banking regulations as per BASEL guidelines and
banking regulations specific to Islamic banks will affect Is-
lamic banks’ performance; this paper dwell into assessing the
impact of regulations on Islamic banks in the two most Islamic
banking developed region, namely Asia and the GCC.
It has been noted by the regulators and practitioners and
evident from above discussion that one of the key issues in
harmonizing the Islamic finance industry is the varying regu-
latory framework in many countries they operate. As per the
authors' best knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on
how the variable legislation can impact their performance in
different jurisdictions. The uniqueness of the paper lies in that
fact that the paper make use of both banking regulation and
Shariah regulation variable and assess its impact on the Is-
lamic banks’ performance in different jurisdictions. The paper
also contributes to the Islamic banking literature by showing
how similar determinants of Islamic banks performances can
vary as per the two important region of Islamic banking and
finance namely Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and South/
Southeast Asia (SSA). The findings of the paper are crucial for
lawmakers to resolve the legal issues whether it is related to
banking or Shariah regulation which are impediment for the
growth of the Islamic finance industry.
The rest of the paper is structured as: Section 2 will discuss
the existing literature related to theme of the paper and
highlight the contribution of current paper to the existing
literature. Section 3 will focus on the data and empirical model
chosen to be used in this paper. Section 4 will discuss the
empirical findings and policy recommendations while lastly;
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Regulatory frameworks and supervision are vital to ensure
the performance of any financial institution, including its
ability to enhance financial institutions' credibility, directly
impacting depositors or investors' faith in the financial insti-
tution. The main purpose of having regulatory frameworks for
banks is to alleviate excessive risks which will in turn increase
a bank's performance or profitability. However, unlike con-
ventional banks, Islamic banks bear unique risks that are
complex to mitigate and since regulations applied to Islamic
banks are mostly adopted from the conventional viewpoint;
existing banking regulations are not effective to cater for Is-
lamic banks' distinct risks.
Analysing the impact of regulatory frameworks on bank
performance in isolation is inadequate. The new regulations
underpinning Basel III aspires to make the global banking
system safer by redressing many of the flaws that became
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depth of capital and renewing the focus on liquidity man-
agement is intended to spur banks to improve their underlying
risk-management capabilities. This will raise the biggest
challenge for banks; without compromising returns they need
to incorporate a higher level of risk management in their
strategies. With the onset of Basel III regulations it is imper-
ative to determine if Islamic banking system is better equipped
to withstand any future financial turmoil.
Although many have recognized the critical need of
effective legal framework in governing banking activities,
there is of yet uniform set of regulatory framework governing
Islamic financial services industry (Mutalip, 2008; Alam,
2013). Most of jurisdictions with Islamic banking practices
have been heavily relying on existing conventional banking
regulations (Alam, 2013). Many of the recent debate are of
criticism on the shortcomings of Basel III Accord which fail to
address the risk issues specific to Islamic financing. Concern
about this, Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) have
adapted certain elements from the Basel standards and
developed risk management guidelines particularly for Islamic
financial service industry.2 Nonetheless, the international
acceptance of IFSB's standard for Islamic banking practice is
yet to be seen (Alam, 2013).
Many studies have found that impact of regulatory frame-
works on banks' performance vary under the influence of
bank-specific, macroeconomic, and financial development;
(Barth, Lin, et al. 2010), (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine,
Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions and The Cost of
Financial Intermediation 2003) and (Flamini, McDonald, &
Schumacher, 2009). Bank-specific factors like the size of a
bank can be strongly related to the condition of a nation's
regulatory framework. For instance, in a country that has only
a few but substantially large-sized banks, it could resemble
that the country is very restrictive on approving applications
for new banks. This causes healthy competition to deteriorate
and may allow existing banks to gain higher profits; banks
could charge a high interest rate to borrowers while paying a
lower rate to depositors because these banks are deemed to be
safe by the customers (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine,
Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions and The Cost of
Financial Intermediation 2003). Flamini et al. (2009) supports
this idea through their finding that bank size is positively
related to profitability, which they explained is due to large-
sized banks' ability to exploit economies of scale.
One of the ways to measure the financial development of a
nation is by looking into its development in stock market or
development in the banking industry because this indicates
whether the county's financial sector is competitive and oper-
ating efficiently. A developed stock market suggests that the
country's market is performing better, leading to a more2 The IFSB have issued several guidelines including: Guiding Principles on
Liquidity Risk Management in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services
(IIFS); Guidance Note on Quantitative Measures for Liquidity Risk Man-
agement in IIFS; Technical Note on Issues Strengthening Liquidity Manage-
ment of IIFS: The Development of Islamic Money Market; Revised Capital
Adequacy Standard for IIFS.competitive environment and which imposes a downward
pressure on banks' profitability; (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, &
Levine, 2003, p. 63) and (Levine & Zervos, 1998). On the
contrary, Ben Naceur and Goaied (2008) found that the stock
market and banking industry are complements of each other,
meaning that in order for banks to increase their profitability,
the country should focus on encouraging the development and
efficiency of stock market. Additionally, ownership structure
of banks also play an important role on their performance.
Based on traditional competition-fragility view, in competitive
markets, banks earn lower profits due to not being able to earn
monopoly rents (Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014). Barth et al.
(2010) asserted that banks owned by governments are actu-
ally dominated by politicians to gain on their political objec-
tives such as providing jobs for their supporters or bailing out
state-owned enterprises that are not performing well.
There are some recent studies which looked into the per-
formance of Islamic banks from regional perspective. Al-
Wesabi and Ahmad (2013) in their study on GCC's Islamic
banks found that credit risk of Islamic banks was significantly
affected by management quality, liquidity, risky assets and
GDP. In similar context Alandejani and Asutay (2017) found
that sectoral financing growth of Islamic banks increases the
credit risk exposures of Islamic banks in the GCC compared to
tehri conventional counterparts. In terms of bank failure, it was
reported by Fakhfekh, Hachicha, Jawadi, Selmi, and Cheffou
(2016) that GCC's Islamic banks are more resilient than con-
ventional banks and especially in Saudi Arabia within the
region. Alandejani, Kutan, and Samargandi (2017) also noted
that Islamic banks in the GCC region have a higher incidence
of failure and by improving regulatory qualities will reduces
the hazard rate of survival time in the GCC's banking sector. A
similar sentiment was echoed by Pappas, Ongena, Izzeldin,
and Fuertes (2016) study which noted that hazard rate of Is-
lamic bank are more prone to regional marcoeconomic
conditions.
If we specifically look into Islamic banking regulation, it is
bound to be more complex than its conventional counterpart
given the basis of Sharia law which can be interpreted and
implemented varyingly according to different jurisdictions.
For instance, the regulations imposed will determine whether
the banking industry in a specific country is allowed to operate
Islamic windows. The reason behind allowing the sale of Is-
lamic financial instruments through a window is highly related
to increase the competitive banking in the given country.
Through Islamic windows, competition can be enhanced
resulting in a lower cost of financing for Sharia-compliant
financial products (Mejia, Aljabrin, Awad, Norat, & Song,
2014), which could favourably affect the profitability of the
Islamic bank. This notion is true for Bangladesh, whereby
Islamic windows intensified the competition in the banking
industry, forcing banks to manage their income and costs
efficiently in order to be profitable in their operations (Miah &
Sharmeen, 2015).
There is also a regulation issue related to Sharia-
compliance, which can vary due to different schools of Is-
lamic thought which are managed by the members of a Sharia
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responsible in ensuring that the financial products offered by
Islamic banks are within the tenets of Sharia principles.
However, since interpretation of Sharia varies according to
different schools of thought (Madhab), the composition of the
SSB plays an important role in regulating Islamic bank oper-
ation. Many of the countries that operate Islamic banking
impose a regulation of minimum three appointed Sharia
scholars to be in the SSB (Hasan, 2010).
Sharia is being interpreted in numerous jurisdictions
differently due to contradicting explanations of Sharia law
from four different schools of thought in Islam which are,
Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafii (Hamza, 2013). The dis-
tribution of countries following different schools of thought is
summarized in Table 1.
Asia is home to most Muslims in this world, with Indonesia
being a nation consisting of the largest Muslim population in a
country followed by Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (Ernst &
& Young, 2014, p. 82). The differences in implementation of
Islamic banking regulations may rise due to Sharia law playing
varying roles in different jurisdictions. In countries where
Sharia law is the fundamental law of the land, like KSA and
Pakistan, these countries tend to be stricter in terms of Islamic
banking regulations (Song & Oosthuizen, 2014, p. 40).
Another implication of differences in Islamic banking regu-
lation is that some conventional banks are allowed to offer
Islamic banking products and services through an Islamic
window. Islamic windows are authorized to operate in coun-
tries such as Malaysia and KSA but banned from countries
such as Kuwait and Qatar. Malaysia and KSA are two of the
leading countries in development of Islamic banking; with
KSA holding 19% and Malaysia holding 9.3% of the global
Islamic banking assets (IFSB, 2016).
An additional consequence of having varying regulations
implemented worldwide is that these banking operations are
non-comparable which could adversely affect Islamic banks'
credibility. Take for instance, the method for calculating
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), in countries whereby there is
only one integrated regulatory framework for all banks; Is-
lamic banks are expected to follow the BASEL Accord to
compute CAR. However, for countries like Malaysia, regula-
tory bodies like IFSB published an amended version of the
CAR computation which addresses the need of Islamic banks
different nature of encountering risks. Due to varying CAR
computation methods, the CAR value computed by Islamic
banks are not comparable on an international scale, making
Islamic banks’ reports not worthy of reliance or trust.Table 1
Geographical dispersion of Islamic schools of taught.
School of Taught List of Countries
Maliki Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria and Kuwait
Hanafi Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China, Bangladesh, Ira
Hanbali Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq
Shafii Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, IndonesiaLooking into the regulatory differences for Islamic
banking around the world, it is judicious to assume that the
impact of regulatory frameworks on Islamic banks' perfor-
mance cannot be assessed in isolation. There are many other
variables that need to be controlled like monopolistic power,
a nation's well-being, or banks' market concentration in the
economy. This paper contributes to the literature by con-
trolling for variables that will most likely affect the imple-
mentation of Islamic banking regulatory such as SHAREG
(controls for whether a country implements Sharia law as its
fundamental law), ISBANKREG (distinguishes if there is a
separate act or regulatory framework applicable only to Is-
lamic banks), SSB (looks into the composition or number of
Sharia supervisory board members) and NATSSB (identifies
whether each country has a national Sharia supervisory au-
thority). These variables are taken into account for this
research paper to further understand how these external
variables could influence the effect of implementing regula-
tory frameworks in selected regions, which in turn will affect
Islamic banks' performance.
3. Data and methodology3.1. DataSample has been taken from two Islamic banking devel-
oped region, Asia and the GCC region. The countries repre-
senting the GCC region are Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The countries rep-
resenting South/Southeast Asian (SSA) region are Malaysia,
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan. These countries are
selected precisely due to their promising growth in the area of
Islamic banking. All these ten contribute two-third of global
Islamic banking industry. Banking data has been taken from
Bankscope database over the period 2006e2015. Macroeco-
nomic variables such as GDP growth and inflation were ob-
tained from the World Development Indicators. The financial
development indicators were obtained from the Global
Financial Development Database provided by The World
Bank. Banking regulation data were taken from World Bank's
2013 Regulation and Supervisory Database (Barth, Lin, Ma,
Seade, & Song, 2013) to compute an indicator of supervi-
sory oversight. Lastly, variables related to Islamic regulation
were collected through various methods. The data for number
of Sharia board members recruited (SSB), was obtained
through annual reports of each bank. Data for the variable
representing whether Sharia is the fundamental rule of law in
the government (SHAREG) is obtained from the World Factq, Albania, Syria, Egypt and Jordan
, Brunei, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Maldives
Table 2
Distribution of sample of Islamic banks selected.
Country Number of Islamic Banks Percentage
Gulf Cooperation Council
Bahrain 18 40%
Kuwait 8 18%
Qatar 5 11%
Oman 2 4%
Saudi Arabia 4 9%
United Arab Emirates 8 18%
Total 45 100%
Asia
Bangladesh 7 16%
Indonesia 10 23%
Malaysia 18 42%
Pakistan 8 19%
Total 43 100%
The significance of the Islamic banking in the banking sector for both regions
combined can be shown in Table 3 which represent the allocation of total
assets of both banking concepts. The table shows there is a significant increase
in size of Islamic banking industry between 2006 and 2015. Conventional
banking industry however, has been decreased in size over the period, from
90.21 percent in 2006 to 84.48 percent in 2015. The growth rate of total assets
of Islamic banking has increased significantly from 9.79 percent in 2006 to
15.52 percent in 2015.
Table 4
Islamic banking share in total banking assets by jurisdiction.
Countries 2015 (%) Countries 2015 (%)
Saudi Arabia 15.52 UAE 18.4
Kuwait 38.9 Bahrain 9
Qatar 26.1 Pakistan 8.2
Malaysia 23 Oman 4.8
Bangladesh 19.4 Indonesia 4.2
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REG was obtained from discussions in Hasan (2010).
The sample for this research constitutes a number of 88
Islamic banks from both regions; 45 Islamic banks in the GCC
region and 43 Islamic banks in the Asia region. The distri-
bution for the sample selected is presented in Table 2 below.
For the respective jurisdictions under the study, we can see
that Islamic banking assets has significant proportion out of
total banking assets. From Table 4, it can be seen that share of
Islamic banking in its total domestic banking sector for Saudi
Arabia is around 49% share in 2015 followed by Kuwait at
38.9%. Qatar stand third at 26.1% trailed by Malaysia at
23.0%. Bangladesh comes next at 19.4% followed by the
United Arab Emirates at 18.4%.
Source: IFSB, 20163.2. Empirical modelPoghosyan and Hesse (2009) claimed that studies on de-
terminants of bank profitability can suffer from issues such as
profit being highly persistent, omitted variables and endoge-
neity biasness. Due to these issues, this paper employs a dy-
namic panel technique to address these potential problems.
The traditional Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator isTable 3
Distribution of total assets between conventional and Islamic banks.
2006 2009 20
Million (USD) % Million (USD) % Mi
Conventional banks 1197910 90.21 1855779 86.25 23
Islamic banks 130061 9.79 295866 13.75 38
Total 1327972 2151646 27
Source: Bankscope database and author's own calculations.subject to many flaws such as autocorrelation, hetero-
scedasticity, and endogeneity. These problems arise especially
because OLS regression holds strong assumptions about the
residuals, which could be unrealistic. Indefinitely, these flaws
have an adverse impact on statistical inferences. Another
downside to OLS is that the OLS estimators are based on first
difference, which means it causes fixed effects estimators to
inconsistent especially when a small time period is used
(Nickell, 1981).
The General Method of Moments (GMM) method is known
to address these potential problems that can arise in re-
gressions, especially in a dynamic setting. In simple terms, the
GMM technique derives estimators from statements describing
the data and parameters, commonly referred to as ‘moment
conditions’. One of the commonly used estimator for dynamic
panel data models is introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991),
commonly referred to as ‘difference GMM’, whereby they
suggested that by including all lagged values of the dependent
and independent variables as instruments, efficiency and
consistency in results can be achieved. The benefit of using
this technique is that it removes any potential source of bias
that could arise from omitted variables (Arellano & Bond,
1995). However, the difference GMM was later condemned
for its weaknesses in a paper written by Arellano and Bond
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). They found that
when this estimator is applied to a panel with a small time
frame, this condition causes the estimator to be inefficient
because the instruments (lagged variables) being used to es-
timate are considered weak (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis,
2008). The weakness of the difference GMM estimator in-
tensifies in the case of variables being closer to being a
random walk (contains unit root) (Baum, 2006).
In order to avoid the complication mentioned above, this
paper will use the two step ‘system GMM’ introduced by
Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
specifically because this estimation is appropriate for small T
and large N panel data. The system GMM not only includes
the lagged levels, it also takes into account the lagged11 2013 2015
llion (USD) % Million (USD) % Million (USD) %
56262 85.90 2784361 85.04 3245259 84.48
6738 14.10 489765 14.96 578676 15.52
42999 3274126 3823935
Table 5
Classification of selected variables according to model.
Variables Model
Specifications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Bank-Specific SIZE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CAP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CONC ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Macro-economic GDP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
INF ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
GFC ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Financial BANKB ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Development COMP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bank SPOWER ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Regulation CAPRQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
PRMONIT ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ACTR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Islamic SHAREG ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Regulatory ISBANKREG ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Specific SSB ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
NATSSB ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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taking the first difference of the equation, the unobserved fixed
effects are disposed (Ben Naceur & Omran, 2011). Due to
these reasons, the system GMM produces a flexible variance-
covariance structure under the moment conditions (Lee &
Hsieh, 2013).3.3. MethodologyThe linear dynamic panel data equation is as follows:
Perfik;t ¼ b1Perfitk1þ b2BSik;t þ b3Mi;t þ b4GFCi;t þ b5FDi;t
þ b6CONCi;t þ b7REGi;t þ b8IRi;t þ b9SSBik;t þ εi;t
Where Perfik;t is the measure for performance of bank k in
country i for the time t, which is measured by two different
proxies of the bank's profitability namely Return on Assets
(ROA) and Non-interest Net Revenue (NINR). BSik;t is a vector
for bank-specific variables namely Bank Size (SIZE) and
Capital (CAP) for bank k in country i for the period of t.Mi;t is
a vector of macro factors and are included in the main
regression to take account of broad banking system differences
across the countries in the sample. The average annual growth
rate of gross domestic product per capita (DGDP) is used to
control for each country's economic performance. Another
country-specific variable is average annual growth rate of
consumer price index to account for inflation (INF). GFCi;t is
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for the period
between the years of 2007e2008 to account for the impact of
the global financial crises on country i for the time period t.
FDi;t is a vector for variables related to financial development
of country namely Bank-based Market (BANKB) and Banking
Industry Competition (COMP). CONCi;t is a measure of how
concentrated the banking industry is in country i for the time
period t.; REGi;t represents the level of banking regulation
classified as supervisory power (SPOWER), capital re-
quirements (CAPRQ), private monitoring (PRMONIT) andrestrictions on bank activities (ACTR) in each country. Lastly,
IRi;t is a vector for Islamic related regulations namely Sharia
Regulation (SHAREG), a dummy variable which indicate
whether each country in the sample based their fundamental
law on Sharia law or common law. The SHAREG dummy
variable takes the value of 1 if the country uses Sharia law as
its fundamental law and 0 if otherwise. Islamic Regulatory
Framework (ISBANKREG) as a dummy variable shows
whether each country has a separate regulatory framework
specifically tailored for Islamic banks and/or distinguishes
Islamic banks distinct operations within a single conventional
regulatory framework. If so, the ISBANKREG dummy variable
takes a value of 1 and if there is no distinction of Islamic banks
in the banking regulatory framework at all, the dummy vari-
able will take a value of 0. National Sharia Supervisory Au-
thority (NATSSB) used as a dummy variable to indicate
whether there is a Sharia supervisory authority that supervises
Islamic Banks' Sharia-compliance on a national scale. while
SSBik;t measures the number of Sharia scholars in the Sharia
supervisory board of bank k in country i for the time period t.
The estimation or equation stated above will regress the de-
terminants of Islamic banks' performance on all Islamic banks
under both regions, the GCC and Asia using all two proxies
for the dependent variable (performance) namely return on
assets (ROA) as PERF1 and non-interest net revenue (NNIR)
as PERF2. A outline of the different estimations for the
analysis is presented in Table 5.
4. Empirical findings and policy recommendations4.1. Descriptive statisticsTable 6 represents the summary statistics for all variables
that are listed in both the samples. It can be seen that the
standard deviation for the variables are quite large, these large
values in standard deviations indicate that it is in fact impor-
tant to control for bank-specific, macroeconomic and financial
Table 6
Summary statistics.
Summary Statistics for All Variables in GCC Sample
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
PERF1 358 0.986049 0.08665293 0.5909091 0.3825018
PERF2 355 45.00366 52.67317 454.32 369.23
SIZE 349 7.823821 1.672519 3.490429 11.31516
CAPITAL 361 0.3640361 0.2992902 0.0634117 0.9977765
CONCENTRATION 315 73.93618 13.68141 44.0874 90.38332
GDP 440 5.49276 4.666167 7.076103 26.1704
INLFATION 450 3.745213 3.401243 4.863278 15.05015
GFC 450 0.2 0.4004452 0 1
BANKBASED 273 65.02213 30.70535 26.97095 133.3709
COMPETITION 315 0.424947 0.0926824 0.251681 0.624157
SHARIAREG 450 0.3777778 0.4853713 0 1
ISLAMBANKREG 450 0.6888889 0.4634634 0 1
SSB 426 3.539906 1.174054 0 6
NATSSB 450 0.3555556 0.4792141 0 1
Summary Statistics of All Variables in SSA Sample
PERF1 266 0.0071463 0.0340028 0.2577872 0.2103702
PERF2 262 24.57634 24.15933 27.69 151.46
SIZE 261 6.697584 1.769628 2.117889 10.05604
CAPITAL 274 0.1496076 0.2104657 0.7721086 1
CONCENTRATION 301 52.78677 13.2749 31.94732 76.21074
GDP 430 5.175295 1.853389 1.513685 7.667304
INLFATION 430 6.060357 3.957934 0.5833084 20.28612
GFC 430 0.2 0.4004659 0 1
BANKBASED 301 58.85977 36.92127 18.04864 107.5882
COMPETITION 301 0.1996239 0.1258795 0.012145 0.466163
SHARIAREG 430 0.1860465 0.3895975 0 1
ISLAMBANKREG 430 0.8372093 0.3696046 0 1
SSB 330 5.212121 2.629706 1 12
NATSSB 430 0.8372093 0.3696046 0 1
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interpretation of the effects Islamic banking regulatory vari-
ables have on Islamic banks’ performance.
Referring to, the mean for SIZE, GDP, and BANKB for
both regions do not vary substantially. In other words, Islamic
banks' size, both regions' GDP annual growth and the devel-
opment of Islamic banking industry for both the GCC and SSA
region are somewhat at the same level. However, looking at
the mean for variable CAP, which resembles how well capi-
talized Islamic banks are, it is shown that Islamic banks in the
GCC holds more excess capital in comparison to Islamic
banks in the SSA region on average. In addition, GCC's bank
concentration (CONC) is also shown to be much higher than
SSA region, meaning that there is a smaller amount of Islamic
banks in GCC but they are large in size. Table 6 also indicates
that the development of banking industry (BANKB) is much
higher in the GCC region. However, a lower value of BANKB
for the SSA region indicates that SSA region has a much more
developed stock market. Finally, the summary statistics
showed that there are roughly four Sharia board members
appointed in the GCC while roughly five are appointed in
Islamic banks in SSA region.
In order to assess the model goodness of fit, Wald test was
conducted. Significance of the Wald test indicates that the null
hypothesis that the coefficients are simultaneously equal tozero is rejected. The Wald test is consistently significant for all
panels in both categories, except Panel 2 (Determinants of
Islamic Banks’ Non-interest Net Revenue), which is why it
will be excluded from being analysed. The Arellano-Bond
tests for serial autocorrelation for the first (AR1) and second
order (AR2) autocorrelation were also conducted. There is no
presence of serial autocorrelation in all models estimated. The
results for the Wald tests and Arellano-Bond tests conducted
for each model are presented at the bottom of each model for
all the panels. As for the over-identifying restrictions, Sargan
& Hansen joint tests are applied and reported in the GMM
estimation to indicate the validity of instrumental variables
with the objective of making sure that they are not endogenous
to the differences of the error term. A valid instruments is a
high p-value of the Hansen J statistic of at least 0.25
(Roodman, 2009).4.2. Empirical analysis on estimations under category A
4.2.1. Empirical analysis on determinants of Islamic Banks’
performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
According to Table 7, the lagged dependent variable is
consistently and highly significant at 1% throughout all the
models. This suggests that the specification of this model is
dynamic and that performance or profitability of Islamic banks
Table 7
Panel 1: Determinants of Islamic Banks' Return on Assets: System GMM two-step.
Variables Model Specification
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
L.PERF1 0.61***
(.09)
0.60***
(.09)
0.58***
(.09)
0.58***
(.09)
0.61***
(.09)
0.60***
(.08)
0.60***
(.09)
0.58***
(.11)
.65***
(.10)
.64***
(.10)
.62***
(.11)
.62***
(.10)
0.65***
(.11)
0.65***
(.11)
0.63***
(.11)
0.61***
(.10)
SIZE 2.20
(3.76)
1.43
(2.58)
0.59
(2.42)
0.65
(2.96)
2.19
(3.85)
1.30
(2.82)
0.09
(2.20)
0.52
(2.88)
e e e e e e e e
CAP 9.25
(7.52)
9.67
(8.12)
1.56
(16.62)
3.48
(12.76)
11.04
(7.60)
11.86
(6.64)
6.70
(10.76)
5.98
(12.00)
9.74
(8.51)
10.11
(11.02)
4.01
(8.347)
2.11
(5.25)
10.40
(8.46)
11.86
(9.91)
5.44
(10.24)
2.55
(6.36)
CONC e e e e e e e e .21
(.13)
.18
(.16)
.10
(.12)
.10
(.10)
0.18
(.16)
0.14
(.15)
0.09
(.10)
0.13
(.14)
GDP 0.10
(.11)
0.09
(.12)
0.10
(1.12)
0.11
(.16)
e e e e .03
(.11)
.05
(.11)
.03
(.15)
.02
(.18)
e e e e
INFL e e e e 0.10
(.25)
0.11
(.25)
0.20
(.22)
0.21
(.19)
e e e e 0.22
(.12)
0.20
(.18)
0.20
(.17)
0.29
(.20)
GFC 1.45
(1.70)
1.16
(1.61)
0.59
(1.16)
0.84
(1.44)
1.06
(2.37)
0.71
(2.56)
0.40
(1.66)
0.21
(1.49)
.92
(1.16)
.83
(1.45)
.36
(1.06)
.37
(.92)
0.00
(1.47)
0.13
(1.71)
0.49
(1.36)
0.65
(1.10)
BANKB ¡0.08*
(.04)
¡0.09*
(.050)
0.08
(.056)
0.08
(.06)
¡0.09*
(.04)
¡0.10**
(.044)
¡0.09***
(.039)
¡0.08**
(.042)
.13***
(.047)
.13***
(.044)
.10*
(.07)
.10
(.06)
¡0.11***
(.039)
¡0.11***
(.04)
¡0.10*
(.056)
¡0.09*
(.051)
COMP 2.22
(23.14)
2.75
(17.95)
4.36
(15.57)
3.28
(20.55)
5.97
(18.09)
1.69
(14.20)
1.75
(14.84)
2.31
(22.17)
8.92
(12.17)
10.33
(12.00)
7.40
(12.08)
4.98
(11.38)
7.5
(10.81)
6.98
(10.33)
6.48
(11.08)
2.02
(11.81)
SHAREG 9.69
(14.21)
e e e 10.29
(12.40)
e e e 8.79
(5.13)
e e e 8.08
(6.01)
e e e
ISBANKREG e 10.80
(14.99)
e e e 10.58
(11.46)
e e e 11.63
(11.84)
e e e 10.90
(11.31)
e e
SSB e e 1.38
(5.15)
e e e 0.84
(3.85)
e e e 1.22
(3.74)
e e e 1.45
(4.54)
e
NATSSB e e e 0.36
(4.76)
e e e 2.36
(6.57)
e e e 2.07
(3.68)
e e e 3.72
(5.17)
Wald test 16.65*** 13.29*** 21.92*** 21.06*** 14.68 14*** 16.02*** 15.46*** 13.06*** 16*** 13.97*** 16.97*** 14*** 18.9*** 12.25*** 13.86***
AR (1) 1.58 1.57 1.48 1.52 1.58 1.57 1.48 1.46 1.88 1.8867 1.85 1.84 1.86 1.86 1.85 1.81
AR (2) 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.457 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.35 0.32 0.54 0.53 0.43 0.40
Hansen J 0.27 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.45 0.51 0.38 0.27 0.61 0.29 0.28 0.27
No. of Observation 171 171 167 171 171 171 167 171 181 181 177 181 181 181 177 181
No. of Islamic Banks 40 40 39 40 40 40 39 40 41 41 40 41 41 41 40 41
*, **, *** significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 8
Panel 2: Determinants of Islamic Banks' Non-interest Income Ratio: System GMM two-step.
Variables Model Specification
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
L.PERF2 0.15
(.19)
0.22
(.33)
0.102
(.19)
0.276**
(.11)
0.14
(.21)
0.21
(.35)
0.08
(.21)
0.26*
(.14)
0.11
(.18)
0.16
(.16)
0.07
(.18)
0.24**
(.10)
0.12
(.17)
0.16
(.16)
0.07
(.18)
0.23**
(.09)
SIZE 16.14
(15.89)
36.80
(37.61)
8.40
(20.10)
7.32
(14.85)
18.67
(27.25)
38.55
(30.15)
4.63
(2910)
5.72
(18.08)
CAP 10.27
(93.30)
79.67
(13.73)
77.28
(10.04)
84.87
(90.52)
90.56
(12.87)
10.38
(13.94)
89.45
(11.64)
57.27
(97.34)
24.72
(11.80)
16.57
(69.94)
60.90
(91.44)
58.84
(94.58)
23.16
(12.27)
8.65
(91.37)
62.99
(13.71)
36.45
(95.55)
CONC 0.94
(1.16)
0.82
(1.11)
0.86
(1.197)
0.56
(1.21)
0.96
(1.11)
0.82
(1.26)
1.25
(1.35)
0.78
(1.24)
GDP 1.05
(.98)
0.97
(1.18)
0.93
(1.08)
1.43
(1.08)
0.12
(1.07)
0.08
(.82)
0.47
(1.06)
0.80
(1.25)
INFL 1.67
(1.07)
1.60
(1.47)
1.59
(1.13)
1.12
(1.03)
1.21
(.86)
0.79
(.86)
1.33
(1.04)
0.53
(1.11)
GFC 2.55
(7.31)
13.35
(17.24)
0.37
(7.79)
3.33
(5.79)
10.43
(91.0)
18.27
(16.65)
4.698
(19.35)
7.81
(9.29)
1.36
(6.74)
0.96
(6.64)
4.87
(3.72)
2.14
(5.04)
1.72
(9.53)
2.72
(9.04)
1.71
(6.42)
0.86
(7.22)
BANKB 0.02
(.19)
0.00
(.25)
0.02
(.26)
0.19
(.29)
0.12
(.18)
0.16
(.23)
0.08
(.17)
0.00
(.27)
0.07
(.17)
0.07
(.18)
0.03
(.19)
0.09
(.31)
0.09
(.19)
0.05
(.20)
0.09
(.21)
0.02
(.31)
COMP 82.14
(81.72)
19.98
(18.31)
58.54
(11.77)
88.83
(72.94)
48.51
(16.61)
13.88
(16.78)
4.40
(18.65)
61.89
(13.65)
22.96
(13.24)
2.18
(90.62)
42.42
(96.17)
12.32
(80.91)
52.37
(16.52)
3.03
(12.56)
89.26
(14.03)
12.45
(13.36)
SHAREG 21.68
(26.13)
22.93
(25.96)
19.07
(19.13)
22.24
(24.16)
ISBANKREG 36.72
(79.90)
37.62
(75.13)
3.14
(32.00)
20.82
(28.51)
SSB 11.26
(10.66)
10.30
(15.26)
96.24
(86.57)
91.80
(76.78)
NATSSB 14.93
(98.36)
97.76
(82.69)
12.99
(10.74)
92.57
(83.40)
Wald test 3.71 4.3 5.88 11.8 8.81 6.69 12.77 10.54 3.56 3.69 18.24** 7.62 5.66 3.56 15.83** 9.46
AR (1) 1.70 1.35 1.68 1.83 1.58 1.29 1.60 1.76 1.67 1.71 1.68 1.86 1.66 1.65 1.65 1.81
AR (2) 0.22 0.15 0.38 0.08 0.33 0.19 0.44 0.09 0.46 0.39 0.48 0.07 0.45 0.39 0.5 0.18
Hansen J 0.41 0.52 0.36 0.28 0.49 0.41 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.52 0.47 0.29 0.31 0.47 0.28 0.26
No. of Observation 167 167 163 167 167 167 163 167 177 177 173 177 177 177 173 177
No. of Islamic Banks 39 39 38 39 39 39 38 39 40 40 39 40 40 40 39 40
*, **, *** significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 9
Panel 3: Determinants of Islamic Banks' Return on Assets: System GMM two-step.
Variables Model Specification
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
L.PERF1 0.10
(.23)
0.11
(.19)
0.15
(.21)
0.11
(.19)
0.10
(.24)
0.10
(.19)
0.16
(.22)
0.10
(.19)
.07
(.22)
0.08
(.22)
0.13
(.23)
0.08
(.22)
0.06
(.20)
0.09
(.22)
0.14
(.23)
0.09
(.22)
SIZE 0.01
(.01)
0.01** (.00)0.02*** (.00)0.01** (.00)0.01
(.01)
0.01*
(.00)
0.02***(.00)0.01** (.00)
CAP 0.11***(.03) 0.08
(.05)
0.15*** (.03) 0.08
(.05)
0.11*** (.03) 0.07
(.05)
0.15***(.03)0.07
(.05)
0.08** (.04)0.07
(.05)
0.14***(.02)0.07
(.05)
0.09*
(.04)
0.07
(.05)
0.15***(.02) 0.07
(.05)
CONC 0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
GDP 0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
INFL 0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
GFC 0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.01)
0.00
(.00)
0.008
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
BANKB 0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00*
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
COMP 0.02
(.02)
0.00
(.02)
0.01
(.02)
0.00
(.02)
0.02
(.02)
0.00
(.01)
0.02
(.02)
0.00
(.01)
0.01
(.02)
0.00
(.03)
0.01
(.03)
0.00
(.03)
0.01
(.01)
0.00
(.02)
0.01
(.02)
0.00
(.02)
SHAREG 0.12*
(.06)
0.11*
(.06)
0.13
(.10)
0.13
(.09)
ISBANKREG 0.07
(.05)
0.07
(.06)
0.09*
(.05)
0.08*
(.04)
SSB 0.00
(.01)
0.00
(.01)
0.00
(.00)
0.00
(.00)
NATSSB 0.07
(.05)
0.07
(.06)
0.09*
(.05)
0.08*
(.04)
Wald test 29.38*** 75.12*** 68.39*** 75.12*** 47.8*** 95.32***69.83*** 95.32 31.8*** 15.37***14.06*** 15.37***63.87***11.72***11.99*** 11.72***
AR (1) 0.53 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.72 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.75 0.49
AR (2) 1.31 1.42 0.26 1.42 1.28 1.29 1.10 1.29 1.22 0.94 1.03 0.94 1.32 0.87 0.83 0.87
Hansen J 0.44 0.35 0.0.58 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.32 0.38 0.56 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.33 0.28 0.43
No. of Observation 152 152 134 152 152 152 134 152 158 158 140 158 158 158 140 158
No. of Islamic Banks32 32 27 32 32 32 27 32 33 33 28 33 33 33 28 33
*, **, *** significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. standard errors are in parentheses.
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59N. Alam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 19-1 (2019) 49e64is very persistent, considering that the value of the coefficient
is between 0.58 and 0.65. However, this is not true for the case
of Panel 2 (Panel 2 uses Non-interest Net Revenue as the
proxy for Islamic banks’ performance) in Table 8. Without
consistent significance in Wald test and independent variables
throughout the models in Panel 2, panel 2 will not be analysed.
The purpose of running 16 models for each panel is to observe
which variables are consistently significant in order to make a
robust statistical inference. Based on empirical findings, the
two determinants that are important in determining the per-
formance of Islamic banks are the competitiveness of the Is-
lamic banking industry and how developed the banking or
stock market industry is. These findings will be further ana-
lysed below.
Referring to Panel 1, the variable BANKB is consistently
significant at least at 10% and it presents negative coefficients
between the value of 0.08 and .13 throughout Panel 1. In
other words, large development in only the banking industry
operating within GCC is having an adverse impact on the Is-
lamic banks' performance or profitability. It also implies that
the stock market development in GCC is not up to par.
Generally, the development of stock market is a measure of
how well developed a nation's financial structure is. This
notion was also presented by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(2001), whereby they suggested that development in stock
market could enhance the performance of banks in countries
that have lower levels of financial development. In the GCC,
stock market development is minute in comparison to the
world; shares of equity, debt, and banking assets only take up
roughly about 1.5% of the world's total equity market capi-
talization (Kern, 2012). In addition, not all countries within the
GCC are participating in stock trading actively and equally
because about 80% of stocks traded in value are dominated by
KSA and this causes concerns about liquidity especially in
countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait and UAE (Kern, 2012). If
the GCC wants to see a favourable shift in their Islamic
banking industry, they should focus on flourishing their stock
market industry in order to allow investors to be able to
diversify their portfolios. Not only that, but the growing stock
market industry will also simultaneously impose higher
competition on Islamic banks to perform more efficiently by
providing competitive prices of financial services/products to
customers.
Due to immature stock market development, despite the
wealth of these oil-exporting countries, they can still be
considered to not yet having a fully developed financial mar-
ket, especially because banking operations initially started
about forty years ago with GCC's involvement with The World
Bank, starting with The World Bank providing advisory ser-
vices for KSA (Mohammad, Ramadan, & Al-Kibbi, 2015).
Similarly, Islamic banking operations began around the same
time with inception of Dubai Islamic Bank in the year of 1975
(Wilson, 2009). The problem with the banking industry in the
GCC is that because they are oil-exporting countries, they are
heavily dependent on the movement of oil prices and they
suffer from lack of diversification. As mentioned by Gray and
Blejer (2007), the development and strength of GCC'sfinancial structure depends not only on its ability to diversify
economically, but it also depends on how the GCC will
manage their petrochemical resources in the time to come.
This gives the GCC a distinct feature in promoting stock
market development because it is found that specifically in the
GCC region, stock market activities are highly correlated to
pronounced movement in oil prices (Gray & Blejer, 2007).
This notion can be backed by recent news in the GCC stock
market whereby KSA and UAE's stock market made a speedy
recovery from previous week's huge market sell-off due to
declining oil prices. Investors instantaneously gained back
their confidence from the rise in crude oil prices (GulfBase,
2015). This situation illustrates how oil pricing dominates
investors' sentiment particularly in the GCC region.
A main obstacle to overcome here is that under an Islamic
stock market, the stocks traded must be Sharia-compliant.
Sharia-compliant stocks are an issue because of the different
Sharia stock screening methodologies that are being imple-
mented worldwide. Stocks that are Sharia-compliant in other
nations may not be Sharia-compliant in the GCC. To name a
few, Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI), FTSE Global
Islamic Index Series, S&P 500 and Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) are some of the indices that provide
information on whether stocks are Sharia-compliant
(Sengupta, 2012). Different types of screening criteria exist
due to different level of acceptance caused by varying envi-
ronmental and locational factors, including the existence of
different Islamic schools of taught (Adam & Abu Bakar,
2014). Inconsistencies can originate due to the act of Sharia
scholars from different parts of the world passing rulings in
certain territories for the benefit of the people (Maslahah)
residing there. From another perspective, norms for equity
screening could be formulated or manipulated to better suit the
index providers according to their intention. For instance,
Sharia index providers are concerned with stocks that are
being traded at a high volume because these stocks will reflect
the market condition well. Therefore, this notion explains why
some indices like DJIM are interested in the market capitali-
zation of a company instead of its total assets (Khatkhatay &
Nisar, 2007). Even if these screening norms are questionable,
there are no superior boards of authority powerful enough on
an international scale to discontinue these screening methods
and also for most of the time, these rulings are passed with the
ground of providing Maslahah according to jurisdiction.
One of the most highly debated topics is that Sharia-
compliant companies should not be allowed to have any ele-
ments that are knowingly prohibited like Riba, Maysir and
Gharar. However, these elements are still allowed to be pre-
sent in companies because the presence of conventional op-
erations is too dominant in the market today. As stated by
Khatkhatay and Nisar (2007), a business that is truly and
fully Sharia-compliant is rare to find in the commercial busi-
ness world today. Yazi, Morni, and Imm (2015) found that the
demand for recently de-listed Sharia-compliant stocks de-
creases, causing the company's share price to also decline.
Different users of these screening processes have different
objectives leading to inconsistent Sharia-compliance screening
Table 10
Panel 4: Determinants of Islamic Banks' Non-interest Income Ratio: System GMM two-step.
Variables Model Specification
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
L.PERF2 0.83***
(.05)
0.79***
(.06)
0.79***
(.05)
0.79***
(.06)
0.81***(.06) 0.78***
(.06)
0.78***
(.06)
0.78***
(.06)
0.87***
(.06)
0.89***
(.05)
0.82***
(.08)
0.89***
(.05)
0.87***
(.05)
0.87***
(.05)
0.83***
(.07)
0.87***
(.05)
SIZE 4.49
(4.18)
5.63
(5.22)
4.52
(5.53)
5.63
(5.22)
5.27
(4.15)
¡5.85*
(3.45)
3.65
(5.27)
¡5.85*
(3.45)
CAP 38.91
(59.38)
39.70
(46.24)
35.43
(41.17)
39.70
(46.24)
41.87
(55.16)
42.91
(39.30)
38.77
(40.13)
42.91
(39.30)
30.30
(51.17)
27.16
(57.34)
20.63
(31.10)
27.16
(57.34)
29.96
(43.51)
29.49
(35.54)
29.60
(38.46)
29.49
(35.54)
CONC 0.15
(.17)
0.04
(.15)
0.12
(.26)
0.04
(.15)
0.06
(.14)
0.02
(.12)
0.03
(.13)
0.02
(.12)
GDP 0.58
(.90)
0.80
(.63)
0.66
(.59)
0.80
(.63)
0.59
(1.23)
0.20
(1.2)
0.93
(1.13)
0.20
(1.22)
INFL ¡1.08**
(.53)
¡1.07**
(.39)
¡1.48**
(.49)
¡1.07**
(.39)
¡0.90**
(.49)
¡0.84**
(.40)
¡1.69**
(.44)
¡0.84**
(.40)
GFC 3.43
(4.64)
2.28
(3.81)
3.32
(4.61)
2.28
(3.81)
6.33
(5.17)
5.20
(3.86)
7.54
(5.01)
5.20
(3.86)
3.29
(4.72)
2.81
(4.27)
3.48
(4.52)
2.81
(4.27)
5.37
(5.22)
4.01
(4.10)
8.35
(5.61)
4.01
(4.10)
BANKB 0.80
(.63)
0.57
(.45)
0.64
(.48)
0.57
(.45)
0.60
(.44)
0.36
(.26)
0.46
(.39)
0.36
(.26)
0.60
(.57)
0.07
(.24)
0.68
(.71)
0.07
(.24)
0.39
(.34)
0.00
(.21)
0.53
(.45)
0.00
(.21)
COMP 10.10
(15.63)
4.82
(19.38)
10.72
(18.95)
4.82
(19.38)
2.93
(14.87)
7.30
(14.35)
2.77
(14.78)
7.30
(14.35)
13.72
(16.77)
3.994
(18.74)
18.76
(18.49)
3.99
(18.74)
3.72
(14.61)
0.84
(14.91)
4.58
(13.93)
0.84
(14.91)
SHAREG 33.62
(32.71)
28.20
(21.43)
43.58
(39.67)
35.76
(22.83)
ISBANKREG 18.27
(34.70)
17.59
(29.06)
27.39
(32.00)
29.33
(26.04)
SSB 4.19
(6.96)
5.93
(6.65)
8.34
(9.86)
8.79
(6.39)
NATSSB 18.27
(34.70)
17.59
(29.06)
27.39
(32.00)
29.33
(26.04)
Wald test 690*** 254.92*** 373.77*** 254.92*** 381.81*** 199.87*** 290.26*** 199.87*** 494.26*** 406.69*** 225.92*** 406.69*** 481.38*** 401.9*** 223.09*** 401.9***
AR (1) 1.7098 1.726 1.7275 1.726 1.5307 1.5105 1.4996 1.5105 1.7385 1.7786 1.7383 1.7786 1.6067 1.6205 1.5017 1.6205
AR (2) 1.5355 1.4377 1.4921 1.4377 1.5555 1.5105 1.4995 1.5105 1.568 1.5047 1.5085 1.5047 1.5804 1.5218 1.5004 1.5218
Hansen J 0.32 0.31 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.53 0.52 0.46 0.36 0.47 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.53 0.58
No. of Observation 143 143 127 143 143 143 127 143 150 150 134 150 150 150 134 150
No. of Islamic Banks 31 31 27 31 31 31 27 31 33 33 29 33 33 33 29 33
*, **, *** significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. standard errors are in parentheses.
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61N. Alam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 19-1 (2019) 49e64methodologies. Inconsistencies result in adverse reaction from
the investors and affect the perception of the market nega-
tively. With this said, indices providing Sharia-compliance
screening should work together to form a standardized
screening methodology in order to enable Islamic stock mar-
kets to grow not only within the GCC but on a global scale.
Additionally, the remaining countries in the GCC apart from
KSA and UAE must also pick up their pace in expanding their
stock market development instead of allowing only KSA and
UAE to represent the whole GCC nation. As of 2013, KSA and
UAE possess more than half of the wealth in the GCC nation;
44% and 30% respectively (Strategy 2015). In other words, the
performance of Islamic banks in the whole GCC nations is
represented primarily by KSA then UAE.
4.2.2. Empirical analysis on determinants of Islamic Banks’
performance in South/Southeast Asia (SSA)
As mentioned before, the reason behind conducting 16
models under each proxy for Islamic banks' performance is to
observe which variables are producing consistent significant
results as a measure of robustness. Since the Wald test is
consistently significant for all models under both proxies of
Islamic banks’ performance, Panel 3 (ROA) and Panel 4
(NINR) both will be analysed.
According to Table 9, whereby return on assets (ROA) is
used as the proxy for Islamic banks' performance, there are
five positive significant variables that determine the perfor-
mance of Islamic banks in the SSA; they are SIZE, CAP,
SHAREG, ISBANKREG and NATSSB. Starting with SIZE, it
is found to be significant almost consistently throughout the
eight models under Panel 3, with coefficients ranging between
0.01 and 0.02. The results obtained are consistent with studies
by; (Smirlock, 1985), (Ben Naceur & Goaied, 2008), (Flamini
et al., 2009) and (Nguyen, Skully, & Perera, 2012). This result
is however contradicting with other studies that claimed to find
no relevant connection between bank size and bank profit-
ability (performance) such as (Athanasoglou et al., 2008); and
(Ben Naceur & Kandil, 2009). An explanation behind why
Islamic banks' size is positively related to its performance
could be due to that larger bank size allows Islamic banks to
take advantage of economies of scale and scope
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008). There are also theories suggesting
that larger banks perform better because their fairly large size
allows them to diversify their portfolio risks away, but in the
case of Islamic banks, diversifying is a limited option because
it is challenging to find investment options that are Sharia-
compliant. According to Ben Naceur and Kandil (2009),
bank size can also propose the degree of monopoly that exists
within a country's banking industry. They claimed that as the
size of the banks increase, it also increases their monopoly
power, allowing them to charge a higher cost of financing thus
increasing their profitability.
Table 10 indicates that the variable CAP is positively and
significantly related to Islamic banks’ performance in SSA
almost consistently with at least 10% significance throughout
half of the tested models in Panel 4; with a coefficient ranging
between 0.088 and 0.153. An explanation to this finding is thatwell-capitalized Islamic banks tend to perform better, a finding
supported by Wahidudin, Subramanian, Kamaluddin, &
Bahari (2014) and Flamini et al. (2009). In reality there is
always a presence of information asymmetry, and according to
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Berger (1995), with informa-
tion asymmetry present, banks can use the excess capital to
inform or signal customers that the bank is promising a better
future performance. An issue worth mentioning is that the new
Basel III Accord that is in the process of being implemented
might cause trouble for Islamic banks even if they are well
capitalized because regulators now need to further clarify the
proper allocation of capital under Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital,
especially with the use of unique Islamic financial contracts.
Additionally, under the new Basel III Accord, there is a
requirement for Liquidity Coverage Ratio and this may be
problematic to Islamic banks because there is insufficient
amount of Sharia compliant liquidity assets (Kammer et al.,
2015, p. 38). A suggestion for Islamic banks is to postpone
the implementation of the conventional BASEL III until IFSB
or AAOIFI publish a modified version of the Basel III Accord
so that the implementation of these capital adequacy re-
quirements are more suitable specifically for operations of
Islamic banks.
Panel 3 results also show that the variable SHAREG is only
positive and significant at 10% when SIZE is taken into ac-
count. However, when the variable SIZE was eliminated and
the variable CONC was controlled for (from model 9 through
12 in Panel 3), the variable SHAREG becomes irrelevant.
Instead, variables ISBANKREG and NATSSB become posi-
tively significant. To begin, it is worthy to mention that all
these variables produced a significant and positive coefficient,
indicating that Islamic regulatory variables have a favourable
effect on Islamic banks’ performance in SSA. In other words,
in order for Islamic banks to perform better, appropriate Is-
lamic banking regulations must be in place. The variable
SHAREG shows a positive and significant coefficient between
0.119 and 0.115. This finding confirms that an Islamic bank
that is operating in a country whereby Sharia is its funda-
mental law, within the SSA region, has a significantly positive
effect on its performance. An explanation could be that reg-
ulations imposed in the country is already naturally designed
to fit the operations of Islamic banks, without the need to
specify further regulations for banks to abide behind the tenets
of Sharia principles. This notion can be illustrated under the
findings in Panel 3 (model 1 until model 8); when the variable
SHAREG is significant and positive, all the other variables
representing the breakdowns of Sharia regulatory related
variables are not relevant. In a different situation whereby
utilization of Sharia as their fundamental rule of law is irrel-
evant (Model 13 Panel 3), variable SHAREG becomes insig-
nificant while the remaining breakdowns of Sharia regulatory
related variables become significant (refer to model 9 through
model 16 in Panel 3).
Since the finding suggests that if it is not relevant for a
country to base its fundamental law on Sharia or in other
words countries that solely view Islamic banking as an alter-
native resulting from banking innovation, then the country
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of the four countries selected to be under the SSA sample, only
Malaysia has established separate acts for Islamic banking
such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and Islamic Financial
Services Act 2013. The remaining countries are yet to move
forward and pass an entirely separate act for Islamic banking
purposes. Without these acts, Islamic banks are undoubtedly
facing extreme pressure to perform alongside conventional
banks which is problematic considering that Islamic banking
is still in its growing phase. It also worth noting that the var-
iable SSB is not consistently significant, in other words, the
number of Sharia scholars sitting on the Sharia board does not
affect the performance of Islamic banks in the SSA region. A
possible explanation behind this finding is that, even if the
central banks in the SSA region imposed a regulation that each
bank needs a minimum of three Sharia scholars on the Sharia
board (Malkawi, 2014), this still does not suggest that these
Sharia board members will favourably affect the Islamic
banks’ performance. There are many other qualifications and
characteristics of these Sharia members that need to be
considered such as age, qualification, experience, nationality
and etc. (Malkawi, 2014). This is the reason behind why Bank
Negara Malaysia require the Sharia board members to be
comprised of not only Sharia scholars, but also a chartered
accountant, lawyer, central banker and judge because a Sharia
board with this composition will be able to not only solve
issues relating to Sharia compliance but also issues relating to
legal and financial aspects of the Islamic bank (Hasan, 2010).
Similarly, the variable NATSSB represents whether a
country is having a Sharia supervisory authority on a national
scale and it proved to be beneficial to the performance of Is-
lamic banks in SSA, as agreed by Hasan (2010). One way to
interpret this finding is that, monitoring of Islamic banks to
ensure that they are Sharia compliant could be very costly and
difficult to monitor, which is why granting power to a national
Sharia supervisory board can eliminate this problem. Not to
mention that it will ensure standardization of Sharia compliant
activities throughout a nation. This could be the first step prior
to globally standardizing Sharia compliant regulations, start-
ing with forming a Sharia supervisory board on a national
scale, then regional and in due time, on a global scale. How-
ever, there is the issue of supervisors taking advantage of their
power to indulge in personal benefits especially due to lack of
Sharia scholars available at present time (Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002) and (Quintyn & Taylor,
2002). This is where stressing the accountability of these
Sharia members comes into play. A case in point is Malaysia,
the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 stated that if Sharia
members fail to comply with the provided regulations, they
can be jailed maximum eight years or fined up to USD 7.5
million (Liau, 2013). An implication of not having appropriate
supervisory boards could result in massive corruption. For
instance, in Bangladesh, Oriental Bank which was a Sharia-
based bank was found to be massively corrupted through the
embezzlement of money (Rahman, 2008). This form of inci-
dent can be avoided when there are many layers of Sharia
boards to screen through. With the establishment of a nationalSharia supervisory board, Islamic bank activities would have
to be screened by internal Sharia members, external or inde-
pendent Sharia members and lastly by the national Sharia
supervisory board. This makes it difficult for corruption to
occur and it also strengthens customers’ confidence in Islamic
banking.
5. Conclusion
The main aim of this study is to highlight the significance
of regulatory frameworks and the importance of utilizing these
frameworks to implement Islamic banking standards in GCC
and SSA region. In order for Islamic banks to gain more
credibility and perform more efficiently they should expand
through internalization. However, this is an issue considering
that there are no sufficient and consistent Islamic banking
regulations or standards that could fuel a successful internal-
ization process. Due to this problem, the implications of
varying Islamic banking regulations were highlighted across
different region which is adding an obstacle to global
expansion.
A major contribution to existing literature would be the
heavy emphasis on the effects of varying Islamic banking
regulations on Islamic banks' performance. Various new var-
iables were introduced to control for many aspects relating to
Islamic banking regulatory system. This paper also contributed
to the literature by collating countries in order to compare how
similar determinants affecting Islamic banks' performance
differ in behaviour according to two separate regions, the GCC
and SSA. The findings in this paper indicate that under the
GCC region, two factors that are of importance which are
competition and banking sector development. The variable
representing competition uses the Lerner Index as a proxy, and
the variable showed a positive and significant relationship with
Islamic banks' performance. Results suggest that the GCC has
a high market power in the banking industry which results in
lower competition. The variable measuring the banking in-
dustry development shows a negative and significant rela-
tionship with Islamic banks’ performance. This indicates that a
development in stock market is vital in order to improve or
optimize allocation of capital.
Different determinants were found to be of importance in
the SSA region. Bank size and well capitalized banks show a
positive and significant relationship with Islamic banks'
performance. This suggests that large and well capitalized
banks are capable of exploiting economies of scale and
scope. An interesting finding of this paper is that, within the
SSA region, when it is relevant for a country to use Sharia
law as its fundamental law, there is no need for other more
specific Islamic banking regulations such as separate legal
acts on Islamic banking or a national Sharia supervisory
board. However, these specific Islamic banking regulations
are found to be of importance if it is not relevant for a
country to be based on Sharia law. In countries whereby
Sharia law is not used as the foundation of the ruling law, a
separate legal act acknowledging Islamic banks could be
very helpful in aiding Islamic banks to perform better
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lamic banks, this allows Islamic banks to perform better at
their own pace without facing fierce competition from its
conventional counterparts. By understanding the operations
behind Islamic banks through regulating standards, Islamic
banks may decrease their risk of losing depositors or cus-
tomers if they are not capable of providing a comparable rate
of return. Another finding is that giving supervisory authority
to a national Sharia board shows to be beneficial for Islamic
banks’ performance. An explanation could be that a national
Sharia supervisory board can ensure consistent Sharia
compliance in all Islamic financial activities. Not to mention
that standardizing Sharia compliant activities within a nation
brings the country one step closer to being able to rationalize
Sharia compliance with other countries operating Islamic
banking.
To sum up this paper, a noteworthy observation is that
Islamic regulatory variables are only significant in the SSA
region but not the GCC region. The reason behind this could
be because interpretation of Sharia law is much more
consistent within the GCC than it is within the SSA. There-
fore, in order to standardize the standards regulating Islamic
banks worldwide thus promoting the same level of perfor-
mance for Islamic banks, this paper suggests that each policy
should take into account how different factors affect different
regions differently. As mentioned by Barth, Caprio Jr., &
Levine (2004), there is no evidence of a set of practices
that is best for promoting the performance of banks because
the very same set of practices could behave differently under
different institutional, macroeconomic, political and financial
settings.
References
Adam, N. L., & Abu Bakar, N. (2014). Shariah screening process in Malaysia.
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences (ElSevier), 121, 113e123.
Alam, N. (2013). Impact of banking regulation on risk and efficiency in Is-
lamic banking. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 11(1),
29e50.
Al-Wesabi, H. A., & Ahmad, N. H. (2013). Credit risk of Islamic banks in
GCC countries. International Journal of Banking and Finance, 10(2),
1e18.
Alandejani, M., & Asutay, M. (2017). Nonperforming loans in the GCC
banking sectors: Does the Islamic finance matter? Research in Interna-
tional Business and Finance, 42, 832e854.
Alandejani, M., Kutan, A. M., & Samargandi, N. (2017). Do islamic banks fail
more than conventional banks? Journal of International Financial Mar-
kets, Institutions and Money, 50, 135e155.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. R. (1991). Some test of specification for panel data:
Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The
Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277e297.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variables
estimation of error components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68,
29e52.
Athanasoglou, P. P., Brissimis, S. N., & Delis, M. D. (2008). Bank-specific,
industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability.
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institution and Money, 18,
121e136.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and Supervi-
sion: What works best? Journal of Finance Intermediation, 12, 205e248.Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Ma, Y., Seade, J., & Song, F. M. (2010). Do bank
regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank effi-
ciency? Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract¼1579352 (Accessed
16 August 2017).
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Ma, Y., Seade, J., & Song, F. (2013). Do bank regulation,
supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency? Journal of
Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2879e2892.
Baum, C. F. (2006). An Introduction to modern econometrics using stata.
College Station, Texas: STATA Press.
Ben Naceur, S., & Goaied, M. (2008a). The determinants of commercial bank
interest margin and Profitability: Evidence from Tunisia. Frontiers in
Finance and Economics, 5, 106e130.
Working paper 856365 Ben Naceur, S., & Goaied, M. (2008b). The de-
terminants of commercial bank interest margin and Profitability: Evidence
from Tunisia Htpp://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id¼856365.
Ben Naceur, S., & Kandil, M. (2009). The impact of capital requirements on
banks' cost of intermediation and Performance: The case of Egypt. Journal
of Economics and Business, 61, 70e89.
Ben Naceur, S., & Omran, M. (2011). The effects of bank regulations,
competition and financial reforms on banks' performance. Emerging
Markets Review, 12, 1e20.
Berger, A. (1995). The relationship between capital and earnings in banking.
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 27, 432e456.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115e143.
Claessens, S., & Kodres, L. (2014). The regulatory responses to the global
financial Crisis: Some uncomfortable questions. IMF Working Paper 14/
16. (International Monetary Fund) 39.
Dar, H. A., & Presley, J. R. (2000). Lack of profit loss sharing in Islamic
Banking: Management and control imbalances. International Journal of
Islamic Financial Services, 2(2), 3e18.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2003). Regulations, market
structure, institutions and the cost of financial intermediation. NBER.
Working Paper Series 9890.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2001). Financial structure and bank
profitability in financial structure and economic growth: A cross-country
comparison of banks, markets, and development. Massachusetts:
Cambridge.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The
regulation of entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1e37.
Ejaz, N., & Khan, H. (2014). The underlying cause of the global financial
Crisis: An islamic perspective. Economic Papers(The Economic Society of
Australia), 33(1), 45e54.
Ernst& Young. (2014). World islamic banking competitivenes report 2013-
2014. Ernst & Young.
Fakhfekh, M., Hachicha, N., Jawadi, F., Selmi, N., & Cheffou, A. I. (2016).
Measuring volatility persistence for conventional and islamic banks: An
FI-EGARCH approach. Emerging Markets Review, 27(6), 84e99.
Flamini, V., McDonald, C., & Schumacher, L. (2009). The determinants of
commercial bank profitability in sub-saharan africa. IMF Working Paper
(IMF), 29.
Fu, X., Lin, Y., & Molyneux, P. (2014). Bank competition and financial stability
in Asia pacific. Journal of Banking and Finance (Elsevier), 38, 64e77.
Gray, S., & Blejer, M. I. (2007). The Gulf cooperation Council Region:
Financial market development, competitiveness, and economic growth. In
World economic forum - the Arab world competitiveness report 2007 (pp.
41e51).
GulfBase. (2015). UAE bourses bounce back after crude oil prices rebound.
http://www.gulfbase.com/news/uae-bourses-bounce-back-after-crude-oil-
prices-rebound/282684. (Accessed 28 August 2017).
Hamza, H. (2013). Sharia governance in islamic Banks: Effectiveness and
supervision model. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern
Finance and Management, 226e237.
Hasan, Z. (2010). Regulatory framework of Shari’ah governance system in
Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area
Studies, 3(2), 82e115.
64 N. Alam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 19-1 (2019) 49e64IFSB. (2016). Islamic financial services industry report. https://www.ifsb.org/
docs/IFSI%20Stability%20Report%202016%20(final).pdf (Accessed 16
August 2017).
Kammer, A., Norat, M., Pinon, M., Prasad, A., Towe, C., Zeidane, Z., et al.
(2015). Islamic Finance: Opportunities, challenges, and policy options.
IMF Staff Discussion Note. International Monetary Fund.
Kern, S. (2012). GCC financial markets: Long-term prospects for finance in
the Gulf region. Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank Research.
Khatkhatay, M. H., & Nisar, S. (2007). Shariah compliant equity Investments:
An assessment of current screening norms. Islamic Economic Studies,
15(1), 47e76.
Krugman, P. (2009). The return of depression economics and the crisis of
2008. New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc.
Lee, C., &Hsieh,M. (2013). The impact of bank capital on profitability and risk in
asian banking. Journal of International Money and Finance, 32, 251e281.
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth.
The American Economic Review (Jstor), 88(3), 537e558.
Liau, Y. (2013). Insurance journal. 23 August. http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/international/2013/08/23/302671.htm. (Accessed 26 August 2017).
Malkawi, B. H. (2014). A bright Future: Towards an enhanced Shariah su-
pervision in islamic finance. The European Financial Review, 14e16.
Mejia, A. L., Aljabrin, S., Awad, R., Norat, M., & Song, I. (2014). Regulations
and supervisions of islamic banks. IMF Working Paper. International
Monetary Fund, 14/219.
Miah, D. M., & Sharmeen, K. (2015). Relationship between capital, risk and
efficiency: A comparative study between islamic and conventional banks
in Bangladesh. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern
Finance and Management, 8(2), 203e221.
Mohammad,N.,Ramadan,B.,&Al-Kibbi, J. (2015).TheWorldBank.28may. http://
www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/gcc. (Accessed 16 August 2017).
Mutalip, A. L. A. (2008). Practical legal issues in Islamic banking. Malaysian
Islamic finance monthly. www.mifmonthly.com/pdf/2008/April.pdf
(Accessed 16 August 2017).
Nguyen, M., Skully, M., & Perera, S. (2012). Market power, revenue diver-
sification, and bank Stability: Evidence from selected South asian coun-
tries. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
(Elsevier), 22, 897e912.Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica,
49, 1417e1426.
Pappas, V., Ongena, S., Izzeldin, M., & Fuertes, A. M. (2016). A survival
analysis of Islamic and conventional banks. Journal of Financial Services
Research, 39, 1e36.
Poghosyan, T., & Hesse, H. (2009). Oil prices and bank Profitability: Evidence
from major oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
IMF Working Paper 09/220. International Monetary Fund.
Quintyn, M., & Taylor, M. (2002). Regulatory and supervisory independence
and financial stability. IMF Working Paper No. 02/46. International
Monetary Fund.
Rahman, S. (2008). The daily star. 16 April. http://archive.thedailystar.net/
newDesign/story.php?nid¼32312. (Accessed 24 August 2017).
Roodman, D. (2009). How to do Xtabond2: An introduction to difference and
system GMM in stata. The Stata Journal, 9(1), 86e136.
Sengupta, B. (2012). Sharia stock screening: A fund Manager's conundrum.
Cognizant.
Smirlock, M. (1985). Evidence on the (non) relationship between concentra-
tion and profitability in banking. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
17, 69e83.
Song, I., & Oosthuizen, C. (2014). Islamic banking regulation and Supervi-
sion: Survey results and challenges. IMF Working Paper 14/220. Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
Strategy (2015). GCC private banking study, 2015. https://www.strategyand.
pwc.com/media/file/GCC-private-banking-study-2015.pdf (Accessed 16
August, 2017).
Wahidudin, A. N., Subramanian, U., Kamaluddin, M. A., & Bahari, Z. M.
(2014). Factors of profitability in islamic banking - difference between
MENA and ASEAN countries. SSRN.
Wilson, R. (2009). The development of Islamic finance in the GCC.
Kuwait programme on development, governance and globalisation
in the Gulf states. The center for the study of global governance.
LSE. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55281/1/Wilson-2009.pdf (Accessed 16
August 2017).
Yazi, E., Morni, F., & Imm, S. S. (2015). The effects of Shariah compliance
announcement towards stock price changes in Malaysia. Journal of Eco-
nomics, Business and Management, 3(11), 1019e1023.
